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1. Introduction 
 
Philosophy of science typically addresses ‘foundational’ philosophical questions 
about instances of successful scientific research. Although this is certainly one 
crucial task for philosophers of science, our discipline should not exclusively 
focus on successful science. Philosophers of science should also critically assess 
philosophical issues motivated by research that does not constitute scientific 
success – first and foremost, biased research. Because biased research occurs 
frequently, analyzing and criticizing biased research is becoming a central and 
urgent topic in the present philosophy of science.1 
In this paper, I will focus on one particular kind of biased research: 
research that is subject to sponsorship bias. A scientific study is affected by a 
sponsorship bias iff the study is funded by a financially interested sponsor, and 
the outcome of the study is significantly and systematically wrong (or, 
alternatively, distorted or erroneous) in a way aligning with the sponsor’s 
financial interests. I will present and discuss examples of three types of 
sponsorship bias, as these types are perceived as being widespread and 
paradigmatic in the recent literature2:  
 
1. a type of sponsorship bias regarding the choice of the experimental design 																																																								1	See, for instance, Biddle (2007); Brown (2008); Sismondo (2008); Wilholt 
(2009); Radder (2010); Carrier (2013, 2017); Biddle and Leuschner (2015); 
Harker (2015); Elliott (2016); Biddle et al. (2017); de Melo-Martín and Intemann 
(2018); Holman and Elliott (2018); Steel (2018); Stegenga (2018: chapter 10).	
2 These types are usually included into lists of paradigmatic biases in science; see 
Resnik (2000: 265-276), Sismondo (2008: 1911-12), Wilholt (2009: 93), Holman 
and Elliott (2018: 4), Steel (2018: 129-35), and Stegenga (2018: 154-9). Holman 
and Elliott (2018: section 3) provide further useful references. Moreover, I refer 
to the relevant literature on each type of bias in Section 2.  
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of a study (with the ‘Bisphenol A case’ as an example);  
2. a type of sponsorship bias regarding the selection and representation of 
the data obtained in a study (illustrated by the ‘Celebrex case’); 
3. a type of sponsorship bias regarding the choice of the scientific concepts 
used to interpret the results of a study (exemplified by the ‘Tobacco 
case’). 	
In relation to these three types of sponsorship bias, I aim to provide an analysis 
of the notion of ‘wrongness’ (or, alternatively, of distortion or error) figuring in 
the characterization of sponsorship bias just above. In this paper, I take such an 
analysis to consist in answering the following epistemological question:  
 
What is epistemically wrong (that is, unjustified) with examples of 
research affected by sponsorship bias?3  
 
My answer to this question and the main claim of this paper is, what I call, the 
evidential account of epistemic wrongness: 
 
Research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if 
the researchers in question make false claims about the (degree of) 
evidential support of some hypothesis H by data E. 
 
In this paper, I have a rather modest goal: to argue that the evidential account 
captures the epistemic wrongness of the three types of sponsorship bias 
mentioned above. Of course, there might be further types of sponsorship bias, as 
indicated in the recent literature: for instance, a type of sponsorship bias 
regarding the choice of topic for empirical research (Resnik 2000: 267-9; Holman 
and Elliott 2018: 4) and different types of sponsorship bias that involve p-hacking 
in the analysis of data (Stegenga 2018: 157-8). For this reason, it is a fruitful task 
for future research to discuss whether the evidential account can be also be 
applied to further types of sponsorship bias.  
 The plan of the paper is as follows:  
In Section 2, I will present concrete examples illustrating the three 																																																								
3  I do not mean to suggest that this is the only question worth asking with respect 
to sponsorship bias. Other fruitful questions include, for instance, what is 
politically and morally wrong with biased research. For work on moral and 
political wrongness of biased research see, for instance, Shrader-Frechette 
(1994); Kitcher (2011); Kourany (2016). Moreover, Biddle et al. (2017: 166) 
advocate a related distinction between epistemically, morally, and politically 
“detrimental” criticism of scientific research. 
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mentioned types of sponsorship bias.  
In the central Section 3, I will argue that the evidential account provides 
a single satisfactory answer to the question as to what is epistemically wrong with 
all of the three types of sponsorship. In Section 3.1, I will apply the evidential 
account to the Bisphenol A case. Furthermore, in order to motivate my 
application of the evidential account to examples of the remaining two types of 
sponsorship bias, I will specify how the evidential account builds on Carrier’s 
“false advertising” account (Carrier 2013, 2017, 2018). I will argue that the 
evidential account can be portrayed as expanding and making more precise the 
core idea of Carrier’s account in a way that renders it applicable to the Celebrex 
case (Section 3.2) and the Tobacco case (Section 3.3). In section 3.4, I will rebut 
potential counterexamples to the evidential account stemming from Steel’s 
(2018) recent work on sponsorship bias. Finally, in Section 3.5, I will present two 
virtues of the evidential account.  
In Section 4, I will discuss two prominent (potential) alternatives to the 
evidential account in the recent literature: Wilholt’s (2009) conventionalist view 
(my terminology), according to which epistemic wrongness is defined in terms 
of violating methodological conventions (Section 4.1), and Oreskes and 
Conway’s (2010) account that is primarily based on the notion of disagreement 
with expert consensus (Section 4.2). I will argue for two claims: (1) neither of 
the two views provides necessary and sufficient conditions for epistemic 
wrongness; (2) the evidential account should be regarded as a fruitful 
complement to and not necessarily as a competitor of these two views.  
In Section 5, I will summarize the results of my discussion. Section 6 is 
an appendix providing a formal Bayesian argument in support my assessment of 
the Bisphenol A case presented in Section 3.1. 		
2. Types of Sponsorship Bias: Three Examples 
 
In this section, I will present three examples of sponsorship bias in science: an 
example of sponsorship bias regarding the choice of experimental design of a 
study, the Bisphenol A case (Section 2.1), an example of sponsorship bias 
regarding the selection and representation of data, the Celebrex case (Section 
2.2), and an example of a sponsorship bias regarding the choice of the scientific 
concepts used to interpret the results of a study, the Tobacco case (Section 2.3). 
 
2.1 The Bisphenol A case 
The Bisphenol A case illustrates the type sponsorship bias regarding the choice 
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of experimental design of a study. In this particular case, the choice concerns the 
animals used in a study as a specific part of the experimental design.  
Bisphenol A is an environmental estrogen that is used to manufacture 
plastic materials that are, for instance, contained in food and beverage cans. The 
question arises whether Bisphenol A compromises the health of people exposed 
to it. In particular, research was done to answer the question whether Bisphenol 
A – even in low doses – causes certain types of cancer such as prostate cancer. In 
the scientific and philosophical literature, many of the industry-funded studies on 
the effects of Bisphenol A are taken to be paradigm cases of sponsorship bias (for 
an influential survey and meta-study of the scientific literature, see vom Saal and 
Hughes 2005; philosophical analyses include, for instance, Wilholt 2009: 93; 
Carrier 2013: 2560-2561; Biddle and Leuschner 2015: 271-272). In my 
exposition of the example, I will rely on vom Saal and Hughes’ (2005).   
Publicly funded studies and industry-funded studies on whether low doses 
of Bisphenol A cause cancer arrived at strikingly different conclusions: 90% of 
the publicly funded studies on low-dose exposure to Bisphenol A reported 
significant effects; however, none of the industry-funded studies reported such 
effects (vom Saal and Hughes 2005: 928). As vom Saal and Hughes argue, the 
presence of a sponsorship bias is perhaps the best explanation for the striking 
divergence in the results: “Source of funding is highly correlated with positive 
and negative findings in published articles.” (vom Saal and Hughes 2005: 928).  
One important manifestation of sponsorship biases in industry-funded 
studies on Bisphenol A concerns the choice of the experimental design. A case in 
point is the choice of animal used in the studies. Industry-funded studies used 
rats that were known to be insensitive to low-doses of substances similar to 
Bisphenol A such as DES or ethinylestradiol – that is, rats of the CD-SD strain. 
DES, however, was already known to be a carcinogen. Hence, the fact that DES 
did not cause cancer in the CD-SD rats was generally taken to be evidence for 
the claim that rats of this strain are an inappropriate model organism for studies 
on the carcinogenicity of Bisphenol A. As vom Saal and Hughes point out, one 
had good reasons for not using CD-SD rats: “The very low sensitivity of the CD-
SD rat strain to BPA [i.e. Bisphenol A] was predicted by its low sensitivity to 
ethinylestradiol when it was included as a positive control.” (vom Saal and 
Hughes 2005: 929) For this reason, it is accurate to say that the insensitivity of 
CD-SD rats is an empirical lesson from cancer research closely related to 
research on Bisphenol A. Unsurprisingly, all studies on Bisphenol A involving 
CD-SD rats report the absence of significant effects. Moreover, industry-funded 
studies did not only use rats of the CD-SD strain but they also omitted positive 
controls indicating that CD-SD rats are insensitive:  
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“Two industry-funded studies (Ashby et al. 1999; Cagen et al. 1999) 
were designed with DES included as a positive control, which was 
reported by industry spokesmen (Toloken 1998) at a public news 
briefing about the Cagen et al. (1999) study. A critique 
[Environmental Data Services (ENDS) 1998] pointed out that the 
positive control, DES, failed to show a difference from the negative 
controls in each of these studies (Ashby et al. 1999; Cagen et al. 
1999); however, the authors did not indicate in their published 
articles that DES had been used as the positive control. Subsequent 
studies funded by chemical corporations, all of which have reported 
the absence of significant effects for low doses of BPA [i.e. Bisphenol 
A], avoided this problem by simply not including a positive control 
in the experiment.” (vom Saal and Hughes 2005: 929; emphasis 
added) 
Vom Saal and Hughes disclose the interesting fact that a small proportion of 
publicly funded studies on the effects of Bisphenol A also used CD-SD rats 
initially. However, unlike industry-funded studies, publicly funded studies 
stopped using CD-SD rats (for the reason outlined in the previous paragraph) and 
relied on sensitive animals, such as the fetal male CF-1 mouse, in subsequent 
studies: “If the studies that used the CD-SD rat are eliminated from consideration, 
94 of 98 (96%) government-funded studies report significant effects of low doses 
of BPA [i.e. Bisphenol A], whereas 0 of 8 (0%) industry-funded studies report 
significant effects with the same low doses.” (vom Saal and Hughes 2005: 929)  
 In sum, the Bisphenol A case is an instructive but also an extreme case of 
a sponsorship bias (regarding the choice of animals used in the study). But 
although the case is extreme, there are further examples of this type of 
sponsorship bias regarding experimental design (Bero and Rennie 1996; Lexchin 
et al., 2003; vom Saal and Hughes 2005; McGarity and Wagner, 2008; Carrier 
2017, 2018). Now, let me take a look at two further examples of sponsorship bias. 
 
2.2 The Celebrex case 
Another common type sponsorship bias concerns the selection and representation 
of data. In order to illustrate this type, I will use the Celebrex case, involving a 
choice of data segments in a study on the efficacy of the drug Celebrex.  
Brown describes the Celebrex case as follows: 	
“Celebrex, which is used in the treatment of arthritis, was the subject 
of a year-long study sponsored by its maker, Paramacia […]. The 
study purported to show that Celebrex caused fewer side effects than 
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older arthritis drugs. The results were published in JAMA (Journal 
of the American Medical Association) along with a favorable 
editorial. It later turned out that the encouraging results were based 
on the first six months of the study. When the whole study was 
considered, Celebrex held no advantage over older and cheaper 
drugs. On learning this, the author of the favorable editorial was 
furious and remarked on ‘a level of trust that was, perhaps, broken’”. 
(Brown 2008: 193; emphases added) 
 
The Celebrex case is just one among many examples of a sponsorship bias 
concerning the selection and representation of data (for a discussion of further 
cases, see Biddle 2007; Brown 2008; Carrier 2017; Douglas 2000; Doucet and 
Sismondo 2008; Matheson 2008; Michaels 2008; Wilholt 2009; Elliott, 2010). 
Examples of this type of sponsorship bias have the following general structure: 
first, researchers gather experimental data in the course of a study. Second, 
researchers select a part of the complete available data. The partial data, when 
considered in isolation from the rest of the complete available data, is indeed 
‘favorable’, that is, supporting evidence for some hypothesis H. However, 
researchers omit, or ignore, the ‘unfavorable’ remainder of the complete 
available data in the publication of the results of the study – typically without 
making the omission explicit. Third, such a partial omission of data is 
characteristically in line with the economic interests of the sponsor funding the 
study in question.    
 
2.3 The Tobacco case 
I will use the Tobacco case to illustrate a sponsorship bias regarding the choice 
of the scientific concepts used to interpret the results of a study. In the Tobacco 
case, the choice of concept concerns a particular concept of causation.  
The Tobacco case involves the attempt to “create doubt” about a result of 
scientific research. Here, a financially interested sponsor employs scientists in 
order to “create doubt” with respect to established results of scientific research – 
results that are in conflict with the sponsor’s financial interests. The notion of 
creating doubt (or, alternatively, producing or manufacturing doubt) is inspired 
by the infamous expression “doubt is our product” used in an internal memo 
entitled “Smoking and Health Proposal” of the tobacco industry (in this case, the 
company Brown & Williamson) from 1969, as documented by Glantz et al. 
(1996: 171), Michaels (2008a: 11), Proctor (2008: 17; 2011: 289, 617n), and 
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Oreskes and Conway (2010: 34).4  
 One notorious and politically relevant cascade of examples of creating 
doubt consists in the fact tobacco companies hired scientists in order to 
undermine medical research supporting the claim that smoking cigarettes causes 
lung cancer – a claim that was, and still is, in conflict with the financial interests 
of tobacco companies. These scientists “created doubt” about the causal link 
between smoking cigarettes and lung cancer.5  
 The creation of doubt takes many different forms and strategies. It 
sometimes takes the form of biased counter-studies intended to question 
established research results (for instance, on the effects of smoking cigarettes). 
As other philosophers, historians of science and scientists have argued, such 
counter-studies make use of inadequate statistics, ad hoc adjustments, and 
inconsistent data fitting (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Biddle and Leuschner 
2015), are permeated by incorrect empirical statements (Lewandowsky et al. 
2018), and often data has been manipulated or deliberately ignored. Although I 
suspect that the epistemic wrongness of such counter-studies might often turn out 
to be of the same kind as the Bisphenol A case and the Celebrex case, it is not 
my goal in this paper to provide a general and exhaustive account of what is 
epistemically wrong with the creation of doubt, if it takes the form of biased 
counter-studies. Instead, my focus will be on another influential type of creating 
doubt that does not manifest itself in conducting biased counter-studies.  
 I will focus on one way of creating doubt consisting in a sponsorship 
regarding the choice of the scientific concepts used to interpret the results of 
established medical studies on the effects of tobacco smoke. Consider the 
following concrete historical example where the sponsorship bias concerns the 																																																								
4 Appealing to Proctor’s (2008) concept of agnotology (the study of ignorance), 
the concept of “agnotology” is also sometimes used to refer to the creation of 
doubt (for instance, Carrier 2018; see also Fernández Pinto 2017 for a helpful 
classification of different types of agnogenesis and a survey to the recent 
literature on agnotology.) But I think one has to be cautious with Proctor’s notion 
of agnotology, because it is considerably more inclusive than the notion of 
creating doubt. For instance, military research is a subject for agnotology, 
according to Proctor, because it is secret research. It is at least not obvious (to 
me) that secret military research is also an instance of creating doubt. For this 
reason, I use the more restrictive concept of the creation of doubt. 
5 For case studies of creating doubt beyond the tobacco cases (such as regarding 
climate science and medical research), see, for instance, Michaels (2008), Proctor 
and Schiebinger (2008), Oreskes and Conway (2010), Biddle and Leuschner 
(2015), and Biddle et al. (2017), de Melo-Martín and Intemann (2014, 2018), 
Carrier (2017). 
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choice of a particular concept of causation – a choice that aligns with the 
sponsors’ financial interests. The scientist Sheldon Sommers was paid by the 
Council of Tobacco Research (an organization funded directly by the tobacco 
industry) to create doubt about medical studies supporting the hypothesis that 
smoking causes lung cancer. Sommers gave the following answers to questions 
he was confronted with in court: 
 
“Q: Doctor, do you have an opinion presently as to whether cigarette 
smoke is a cause of lung cancer?  
A: In the scientific sense, I believe it is not a cause. 
Q: When you qualify your answer to say ‘in the scientific sense’, 
what do you mean by such a qualification? 
A: Scientific evidence of a causative agent involves that it should be 
both necessary and sufficient to produce a condition. (Sommers 
1985: 65-6, emphases added; Proctor 2011: 270) 
 
In this case, the creator of doubt, Sheldon Sommers, claims that a statistical 
correlation between smoking cigarettes and lung cancer (E) does not, and indeed 
cannot, provide confirming evidence for the hypothesis that smoking causes lung 
cancer (H), if one presupposes the “scientific sense” of cause. According to 
Sommers’ “scientific sense” of cause, a cause (or a “causative agent”) is defined 
as being a necessary and sufficient condition for its effect (Sommers 1985: 66-
8). In other words, Sommers appeals to a simple regularity theory of causation. 
If one adopts this theory of causation, then smoking does not cause cancer 
because some smokers do not get lung cancer, and some people who suffer from 
lung cancer never smoked in their lives. Moreover, a mere correlation between 
smoking cigarettes and lung cancer cannot be supporting evidence for the 
hypothesis that smoking causes lung cancer, since any correlation fails to live up 
to the expectation that a cause has to be sufficient for the effect. Sommers’ choice 
of this particular theory of causation constitutes a sponsorship bias, because the 
choice and its consequence (that is, smoking does not cause lung cancer) aligns 
with the financial interests of Sommers’ employer (the tobacco industry), and the 
choice rests on a mistake, or is at least questionable, as I will argue in Section 
3.3.  
Sommers’ testimony in court is just one example of the creation of doubt 
among numerous other cases (see Glantz et al. 1996; McGarity and Wagner 
2008; Micheals 2008a, 2008b; Proctor 2008, 2011; Proctor and Schiebinger 
2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Regarding this type of creating doubt, the 
arena for the scientists paid by the tobacco industry often was not a scientific one 
(such as a peer-reviewed journal or conference) but a courtroom or a talk show. 
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The scientists hired by the tobacco industry did not directly engage with scientists 
doing medical research but with judges, state attorneys, and journalists instead 
(Oreskes and Conway 2010; Proctor 2011). Also for this reason, creating doubt 
contributed significantly to shaping the public opinion on the health effects of 
cigarette smoking.   
 
 
3. Applying the Evidential Account of Epistemic Wrongness 
 
According to the evidential account, research that is subject to a sponsorship bias 
is epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question make false claims 
about the (degree of) evidential support of some hypothesis H by data E. In this 
section, I will argue that the evidential account adequately captures what is 
epistemically wrong with three paradigmatic types of sponsorship bias. In 
Section 3.1, I will apply the evidential account to the Bisphenol A case. 
Moreover, I will highlight the relationship between the evidential account and 
Carrier’s false advertising account in order to motivate my application of the 
evidential account to the remaining two types of sponsorship bias. I will argue 
that the evidential account can be portrayed as expanding and making precise the 
core idea of Carrier’s false advertising account in a way that renders it applicable 
to the Celebrex case (Section 3.2), and the Tobacco case (Section 3.3). In section 
3.4, I will rebut a potential counterexample to the evidential account stemming 
from Steel’s (2018) recent work. Finally, in Section 3.5, I will present two virtues 
of the evidential account.  
 
3.1 The Bisphenol A case – discussion  	
For a discussion of the Bisphenol A case, it will be useful to introduce the 
following terminology: 
 
• Experimental test results E: low-dose exposure to Bisphenol A does not 
have any “significant effects” on cancer – that is, there is no significant 
correlation.  
• Hypothesis H: low doses of Bisphenol A do not cause cancer in humans. 
• Background knowledge K: experimental design D of the industry-funded 
studies involves insensitive rats of the CD-SD strain. (This background 
knowledge is an empirical lesson from earlier studies, as pointed out at 
the end of Section 2.1.)  
 
With this terminology at hand, I will now argue that standard theories of 
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confirmation and evidence support the evidential account. In particular, I will 
rely on the two major accounts of confirmation and evidence in the current 
philosophical literature: Bayesian confirmation theory and frequentist hypothesis 
testing.6 The crucial upshot is that both Bayesian confirmation theory and 
frequentist hypothesis testing provide arguments in favor of the evidential 
account. 
Let me stress two points to avoid possible misunderstandings about the 
dialectic role of Bayesian confirmation theory and frequentist hypothesis testing 
in this section:  
 
• My reconstruction of the two accounts of confirmation and evidence will 
be rather non-formal because my goal is a non-formal one: to argue that 
the evidential account is applicable to three types of sponsorship bias. The 
applicability does not always depend on the details of mathematical 
machinery built into Bayesian and frequentist approaches, or so I will 
suggest. Only in Section 3.1, I believe it is necessary to provide a more 
formal kind of argument to support the evidential account. 
• My goal is to (re)describe the case studies in both Bayesian and 
frequentist terms. The crucial motivation for such a (re)description 
consists in arguing for the claim that the evidential account can be 
maintained independently of whether one is an advocate of Bayesian 
confirmation theory or of frequentist hypothesis testing. Also because of 
this motivation, I will treat Bayesianism and frequentism as tools. In this 
paper, I will not defend, or assess the merit of, Bayesian confirmation 
theory or frequentist hypothesis testing.7   
 
Bayesian confirmation theory is one of the most widely accepted accounts of 
evidential support and confirmation in the current literature in philosophy of 
science and (formal) epistemology (Horwich 1982; Earman 1992; Bovens and 
Hartmann 2003; Howson and Urbach 2006; Sprenger and Hartmann 2019). In 
the framework of Bayesian confirmation theory, experimental result E confirms 
H relative to K if and only if P(H|K, E) > P(H|K).  																																																								
6 These two philosophical accounts mirror the methodological divide between 
Bayesian and frequentist frameworks in statistics.  
7 A referee identified a further premise I am relying on: that is, Bayesian and 
frequentist approaches permit that epistemic agents can communicate and come 
to agree upon what the (degree of) evidential support in a given situation is (for 
a helpful survey of the literature and a recent assessment of this topic, see 
Sprenger and Hartmann 2019: chapter 11).				
	 11	
Let us assume for the sake of simplicity that, in the Bisphenol A case, K 
deductively entails E. (In the paragraph just below, I will turn to a strategy for 
relaxing this simplifying assumption.) If K deductively entails E, then this has 
consequences: learning E (given K) does not raise the probability of H. Formally 
put, P(H|K, E) = P(H|K). Hence, according to Bayesian confirmation theory, E 
does not confirm H relative to K. If this is correct, the scientists involved in 
industry-funded studies on Bisphenol A falsely assert that E confirms H relative 
to K. Thus, the evidential account captures the Bisphenol A case.   
 In the previous paragraph, I worked with the simplifying assumption that 
the available background knowledge K (including knowledge about the fact that 
the rats used in the industry-funded study where insensitive to Bisphenol A) 
deductively entails E (that there is no correlation between low-dose exposure to 
bisphenol A and cancer). If K deductively entails E, then P(E|K)=1. What 
happens if one relaxes this assumption by assigning (perhaps more realistically) 
a high probability to the proposition that CD-SD rats are insensitive to low doses 
of Bisphenol A? In other words, what if P(E|K) is high but not equal to 1? Let us 
call this the probabilistic version of the Bisphenol A case.   
To deal with the probabilistic version of the Bisphenol A case, I will now 
introduce two premises (that will also turn out to be useful for analyzing the 
Celebrex case in Section 3.2):  
 
1. Adopting a Bayesian theory of confirmation, one can use the notion of 
comparative confirmation: the confirmation that H receives from a body of 
evidence E1 is higher than the confirmatory power that H receives from 
another body of evidence E2. Formally, Bayesians can express this situation 
in terms of the following inequality: P(H|E1) > P(H|E2) (see, for instance, 
Horwich 1982; Fitelson and Hawthorne 2010).  
2. I take the following principle of complete local evidence as a premise: if one 
wants to assess whether some hypothesis H receives evidential support from 
a study, then – in order to guard against defeating evidence – one ought to 
consider all of the data produced by the experiments involved in that study 
(or perhaps in a series of studies on the same subject matter). The principle 
of complete local evidence is weaker than Carnap’s well-known requirement 
of total evidence. According to the latter, “the total evidence available must 
be taken as basis for determining the degree of confirmation” (Carnap 1950: 
211). Carnap’s notion of total evidence is global in the sense that it goes 
beyond the data produced by an experimental study and includes the entire 
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“knowledge situation” (ibid.) of a person. The principle I employ allows for 
a ‘local’ restriction to the data produces by a particular study.8 
 
Making use of the notion of comparative confirmation and the principle of 
complete local evidence, I will now apply the evidential account to the 
probabilistic version of the Bisphenol A case.  
Suppose once more that P(E|K) is high (but not equal to 1), that is, P(E|K) 
» 1. Moreover, suppose that P(K) » 1 – that is, we are highly confident about K 
but not certain. These two assumptions allow me to provide an informal Bayesian 
argument for the evidential account (for the formal Bayesian argument, see the 
Appendix, Section 6).  
 P(E|K) ≈ 1, P(K) ≈ 1 ⇒ P(E) ≈ 1 
 
This inference is licensed by the law of total probability:  
 P(E) = P(E|K) ∙ P(K) + P(E|¬K) ∙ P(¬K) 
 
Now, if P(E) ≈ 1, then also P(E|H) ≈ 1. This inference is justified if we request 
that P(E) ≈ 1	for	all	possible	values	of	P(H). This line of reasoning has 
consequences for the posterior probability P(H|E):  
 P(H|E) = P(E|H) ∙ P(H)P(E) ≈ P(H) 
 
Therefore, E does not confirm H, or, at most, to a very small degree. This 
conclusion is intuitive because the evidence E is simply not surprising. 
Even if E confirms H to a very small degree, it is – to say the least – 
plausible for Bayesians to describe the probabilistic version of the Bisphenol A 
case in the following way: the confirmatory power that H receives from E given 
K is considerably smaller than the confirmatory power that H receives from E if 
one suppresses K.9 We can express this formally as follows: P(H|E, K) < P(H|E). 																																																								
8 For this argument to succeed one might retreat to an even weaker principle 
proposed by Conee and Feldman (2004: 93) requiring that there be “no more 
inclusive body of evidence [E*] had by [subject] S at t such that having [doxastic 
attitude] D toward p does not fit [E*]” (Conee and Feldman 2004: 93; notation 
altered) 
9 Note that the claim that P(H|E, K) < P(H|E) is plausible, given our (non-formal) 
knowledge about this (kind of) case study.  
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Since the biased researchers suppress information about relevant available 
background knowledge (particularly concerning what strain of rat is used), they 
falsely assert that P(H|E) is the relevant probability for assessing the evidential 
support that H receives from the experimental results in this case study. Applying 
the principle of complete local evidence, P(H|E, K) is the relevant probability for 
assessing evidential support in the context of this case study. Hence, the 
evidential account is also able to capture the probabilistic version of the 
Bisphenol A case.  
Frequentist hypothesis testing is the second major account of evidence and 
confirmation in the current literature on confirmation in philosophy of science. 
Statisticians pioneered this approach in the first half of 20th century (see, for 
instance, Fisher 1935; Neyman and Pearson 1967). In this paper, I will focus 
exclusively on one present-day, relatively non-technical philosophical 
articulation of frequentist hypothesis testing, Mayo’s error-statistical version 
(Mayo 1996, 2010; Mayo and Spanos 2006). According to Mayo’s version, the 
experimental result (or outcome) E provides evidence for hypothesis H relative 
to K if and only if H passes severe test T with outcome E (Mayo 1996: 178-80; 
Mayo 2010: 32; Mayo and Spanos 2006: 328-30). Mayo defines the central 
concept of passing a severe test T as follows: H “fits”10 E, and T is “a procedure 
which would have, at least with very high probability, uncovered the falsity of, 
or discrepancies from H, and yet no such error is detected” (Mayo 2010: 32). 
 The experimental design involving insensitive rats of the CD-SD strain 
in the industry-funded study does not constitute a severe test for the hypothesis 
that Bisphenol A does not cause cancer, because a test based on this experimental 
design is not “a procedure which would have, at least with very high probability, 
uncovered the falsity of” (ibid.) this hypothesis. Indeed, Mayo would classify the 
test of the hypothesis that Bisphenol A does not cause cancer as a “zero-severity” 
test, if the test involves rats of the CD-SD strain. She argues that  
 
“such a test is no test at all. It has no power whatsoever at detecting 
the falsity of H. If it is virtually impossible for H to receive a score 
less than E on test T, even if false, then H’s receiving score E provides 
no reason for accepting H; it fails utterly to discriminate H being true 
from H being false” (Mayo 1996: 182).  																																																								
10 Mayo discusses alternative notions of fit including “H does not fit [E] if [E] is 
improbable under H” and “evidence [E] might be said to fit H if [E] is more 
probable under H than under all (or certain specified) alternatives to H” (Mayo 
1996: 179; notation altered). A discussion of the merit of these and other notions 
of fit is however beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Hence, according to Mayo’s error-statistical version of frequentist hypothesis 
testing, E fails to be evidence for H relative to K. 
In sum, I have defended the evidential account of epistemic wrongness 
with respect to the bisphenol A case by relying on two major philosophical 
theories of evidential support and confirmation. Let me now turn to the remaining 
examples of biased research.  
In order to motivate my application of the evidential account to the 
remaining two types of sponsorship bias, I will highlight the relationship between 
the evidential account and Carrier’s false advertising account of, what I call, 
epistemic wrongness.  
Carrier illustrates his account by drawing on the Bisphenol A case 
(Carrier 2013: 2560-2561, 2017: Sections 4-5, forthcoming: Sections 4-5). This 
case is an instance of false advertising because the industry-funded scientists 
claim that the study involving CD-SD rats can be used to show that Bisphenol A 
does not cause cancer. But, Carrier argues, the biased scientists falsely assert that 
the experimental design employed in the study is appropriate for this use. Carrier 
diagnoses a “discrepancy between design and use” (Carrier 2017: Section 4).  
Carrier’s false advertising account and the evidential account agree on a 
common core idea: epistemic wrongness, at least in the context of research 
affected by sponsorship bias, should be understood as consisting in the 
researchers’ false assertions about a study and its results. By contrast, epistemic 
wrongness should not be taken to refer to an ‘intrinsic’ feature of an empirical 
study itself (for instance, to the experimental design or the obtained data) 
independently of what researchers assert about their study. To take a concrete 
example, Carrier and I agree that it is somewhat inaccurate to say that an 
experimental design involving CD-SD rats is biased. Instead, we take the bias to 
consist in the fact that researchers falsely assert that this particular experimental 
design can be put to the use of generating data that confirm (or disconfirm) the 
hypothesis that Bisphenol A causes cancer.      
The evidential account can be understood as an attempt to make more 
precise and to expand the scope of the common core idea just described in two 
ways: (1) in advocating the evidential account, I try to make more precise 
Carrier’s ambiguous notion of “discrepancy” in terms of false assertions about 
the actual evidential support that some hypothesis receives from the data (given 
the principle of complete local evidence). (2) The evidential account is intended 
to have a broader scope than Carrier’s original false advertising account and can 
thus be understood as an attempt to extend the latter. Carrier’s notion of false 
advertising seems to be restricted to the type of sponsorship bias regarding the 
choice of experimental design. The evidential account, however, is supposed to 
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apply to all three types of sponsorship biases presented in Section 2, only one of 
which concerns a sponsorship bias regarding the choice of experimental design 
(the Bisphenol A case). In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, I will argue for the claim that the 
evidential account does indeed apply to two kinds of sponsorship bias that 
Carrier’s approach fails to cover.11  
 
3.2 The Celebrex case – discussion 
From a Bayesian point of view, in the Celebrex case (and cases with a similar 
structure), there are two possible scenarios of interest: 
  
(i) the complete data do not confirm H to any degree,  
(ii) the complete data do indeed confirm H, but considerably less than the 
partial “favorable” data.12 
 
In both scenarios, the industry-funded researchers make a false claim about the 
degree of evidential support of H by E.  
In scenario (i), the industry-funded researchers who select and represent 
the data falsely claim that the complete data are evidence for H. That is, the 
situation is ultimately analogous to the ‘deductive’ version of Bisphenol A case 
in one important respect: E does not provide evidential support of H to any 																																																								
11 A referee asked me to clarify whether the evidential account is committed to 
“epistemic realism” – the view that there are facts about evidential support 
relations. I can only provide a tentative answer here. If one bases the evidential 
account on frequentist hypothesis testing, then facts about evidential support 
relations seem to be grounded in mind-independent facts about frequencies. This 
is compatible with epistemic realism. However, I suspect that a Bayesian version 
of the evidential account is not compatible with epistemic realism, if one takes 
“facts about evidential support relations” to exclusively refer to mind-
independent facts, since all forms of Bayesianism contain a subjective, or 
cognitive, element. But, even for a Bayesian version of the evidential account, 
there might nonetheless be facts about evidential support relations, if one allows 
for a more liberal version of epistemic realism that includes subjective, or 
cognitive, facts. Bayesians differ on what these cognitive facts are. For 
subjectivist Bayesians, facts about whether E is supporting evidence for H are 
determined by facts about the prior probability assigned to H, the laws of 
probability, a probability space, the application of Bayes’ theorem (and perhaps 
the principle of complete local evidence). For objectivist Bayesians, facts about 
evidential support are also determined by further objective principles (such as the 
principle of indifference, etc.).  
12 Of course, there is also a third possible scenario in which the complete data 
confirm H to the same degree as the partial data do. However, this scenario is 
uninteresting because it is not a case of biased research.	
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degree. Despite this analogy, there is, of course, also an important disanalogy 
between the two cases: in the Bisphenol A case, the bias concerns the choice of 
experimental design, while the bias regards the selection and representation of 
data in Celebrex case.  
 Now consider scenario (ii) that makes the Celebrex case genuinely 
interesting and challenging. Using the Bayesian notion of comparative 
confirmation and the principle of complete local evidence (introduced in Section 
3.1), it is now possible to defend the evidential account. In Brown’s example, the 
industry-funded study “purported to show that Celebrex caused fewer side effects 
than older arthritis drugs” (Brown 2008: 193). This hypothesis is simply not 
justified in light of the available evidence because it rests on the researchers’ false 
assertion that the probability of H given the partial evidence Epartial (in Brown’s 
example, the data obtained in the first six months of the study) is the relevant 
probability for assessing the evidential support that H receives from the 
experimental results of the study. However, applying the principle of complete 
local evidence, the researchers should have considered the complete local 
evidence Ecomplete (and not Epartial) for updating their subjective probability of H 
but they failed to do so. Thus, the evidential account applies to the Celebrex case.  
 Let me now apply Mayo’s version of frequentist hypothesis testing to the 
Celebrex case. In Mayo’s framework, it is difficult to define a concept of 
comparative confirmation (unlike in the Bayesian framework). However, it is not 
necessary to do so to defend the evidential account with respect to Celebrex case. 
Mayo can apply the principle of complete local evidence introduced above: if 
one wants to assess whether some hypothesis H receives evidential support from 
the outcome of a study, then one ought to consider all of the data produced by 
the experiments (the severe tests) involved in that study (and perhaps in a whole 
series of studies on the same subject matter). Hence, in the Celebrex case, all one 
needs to look at is the actual complete outcome of severe tests, the actual 
complete data set Ecomplete. If Ecomplete is, as a matter of fact, the complete outcome 
of a severe test procedure T, then, given the principle of complete local evidence, 
Ecomplete (and not Epartial) has to be considered for determining whether some 
hypothesis H passes the severe test T. In the Celebrex case, the hypothesis 
defended by the industry-funded researchers does, on closer scrutiny, not pass 
the test.  
It might well be true that if the outcome of had been Epartial (and not 
Ecomplete, the actual outcome), then the relevant hypothesis would have passed the 
test and, thereby, would have gained evidential support from Epartial. However, 
this is an assessment of the counterfactual outcome of a study that an advocate 
of Mayo’s error-statistical approach need worry about.  
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Hence, if one applies Mayo’s approach and the principle of complete 
local evidence to the Celebrex case, then the biased researchers falsely claim that 
the actual data obtained in the study support the hypothesis in question. This 
conclusion supports the evidential account.	
	
3.3 The Tobacco case – discussion  
In the Tobacco case presented in Section 2.3, the creator of doubt, Sheldon 
Sommers, claims that a correlation between smoking cigarettes and lung cancer 
(E) does not, and indeed cannot, provide confirming evidence for the hypothesis 
that smoking causes lung cancer (H), if one presupposes a “scientific sense” of 
“cause”. (Just to recall, according to Sommers, a cause is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the occurrence of its effect.) For simplicity’s sake, I will 
refer to this claim as the “Sommers’ claim”, which is a particular claim about the 
(degree of) evidential support that H receives from E. 
However, Sommers’ claim is false, because its crucial presupposition 
regarding the “scientific sense” of cause is at odds with our best philosophical 
theories of confirmation and causation in science.  
First, Sommers’ claim is at odds with extant theories of confirmation, 
such as Bayesian confirmation theory and Mayo’s version of frequentist 
hypothesis testing. It is a central feature of such theories of confirmation that 
leads to an inconsistency with Sommers’ claim: such theories explicate evidential 
support in probabilistic terms and they are certainly compatible with correlations 
playing the role of confirming evidence (indeed, such theories of confirmation 
are designed specifically for this purpose).13  
Second, according to our best theories of causation in science, there is no 
good reason to accept Sommers’ decisive presupposition that causes in the 
“scientific sense” have to be necessary and sufficient for their effects.14 Scientists 
use causal notions that are not defined in the way that Sommers’ assumes. For 
instance, they use the notion of a probabilistic cause and the notion of a 
contributing (or partial) cause, independently of the specific smoking-cancer 
case. The use of these causal concepts (that is, probabilistic and contributing 
cause) are also reflected and acknowledged in the philosophical literature on 
causation in the natural and social sciences: for instance, in various probabilistic 
theories of causation (see Hitchcock 2016 for a survey) and in broadly 																																																								
13 The same point applies to rules for inferring causal models from correlations 
as developed by Pearl (2000) and Spirtes et al. (2000).  
14 Proctor (2011: 33-4, 275) advocates a similar line of argument against the 
claim that causes are necessary conditions for their effects (see also Oreskes and 
Conway 2010: 33-4). 
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counterfactual and interventionist theories of causation (for instance, Woodward 
2003).  
If one accepts the mentioned causal concepts and if one accepts some 
probabilistic theory of evidence, then it is, at least, conceptually possible that (a) 
smoking causes lung cancer and that (b) some smokers did not get lung cancer 
(that is, smoking is not a sufficient cause of lung cancer) and that some people 
who got lung cancer did not smoke (that is, that is, smoking is not a necessary 
cause of lung cancer). Therefore, the creators of doubt, such as Sommers, falsely 
assert that correlations between smoking and lung cancer do not count as 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that smoking causes lung cancer.15 Hence, 
the evidential account applies to the Tobacco case. 
 
3.4 A potential counterexample? 
Steel (2018) analyzes a type of sponsorship bias that, at least prima facie, poses 
a challenge to the evidential account. In this section, I will argue that the sort of 
examples that Steel is interested in can indeed be captured by the evidential 
account. Hence, these examples do not pose a threat to the evidential account. 
Steel argues that in some examples of sponsorship bias the scientists 
carrying out and publishing the research do not endorse false claims about 
evidential support relationships, contrary to the evidential account (Steel 2018: 
135). The falsehoods (or the systematic distortions or errors) are not located on 
the side of the researchers and their claims but rather on the side of their audience 
(that is, on the side of the consumers or users of the research in question). Steel 
holds that this is what happens if sponsorship bias takes the form of researchers 
endorsing “misleading claims” about the results of a study. According to Steel’s 
proposal, misleading claims are “not necessarily false, but are likely to lead to 
false beliefs among those who encounter them” (Steel 2018: 129; see also p. 119, 
135) That is, misleading claims “true or ambiguously interpretable as true” (Steel 
2018: 139), and such claims “encourage others” to infer false claims about the 
results of a study. In the context of medical research, the “others” typically 
include patients, physicians, and health insurers who have to make decisions 
based on the published results of studies (Steel 2018: 137).  
																																																								
15 Sommers’ choice of defining a cause in terms of a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the effect leads to introducing an extremely (perhaps absurdly) high 
standard of what counts as evidence – that is, only perfect regularities but not 
correlations may play the role of evidence. Douglas provides a detailed 
discussion of this problematic kind of raising evidential standards by using the 
concept of “universal-standards bullshit” (Douglas 2006: 220-221). 
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Steel’s argues that, at least prima facie, examples of misleading claims raise 
complications for the Cochrane definition of sponsorship bias. According to the 
Cochrane definition, a bias consists in a deviation from the truth (that is, in 
falsehoods). However, Steel holds that “misleading claims lead to bias not 
necessarily because they systematically deviate from the truth themselves, but 
because they encourage others to draw inferences that do.” (Steel 2018: 135) For 
this reason Steel argues: “misleading communication raises complications for 
such definitions, because misleading claims are naturally regarded as biased but 
may nevertheless be true.” (Steel 2018: 140) Steel’s point also carries over to the 
evidential account and I will discuss it as such.    
Consider one of Steel’s own examples of a misleading claim appearing in 
an article about the adverse effects of paroxetine (Paxil). This article reports the 
results of a study sponsored by GlaxoSmithKline, the financially interested 
producer of paroxetine: 
 
“The results section of the article reported that 11 serious adverse 
effects occurred in the Paxil (paroxetine) group compared to only 2 
among those treated with a placebo (Keller et al. 2001, 769). One 
might regard a 450% increase in serious adverse effects as a red flag. 
Yet the conclusion of the article states, ‘Paroxetine is generally well 
tolerated and effective for treating depression in adolescents’ (Keller 
et al. 2001, 762).” (Steel 2018: 132; emphasis added) 
 
According to Steel, the conclusion of the article (that Paroxetine is generally well 
tolerated) is a misleading claim for two reasons: first, the phrase “generally well 
tolerated” could be “understood to mean that most did not suffer from serious 
adverse effects. Out of 93 patients in the paroxetine group, only 11 or about 12% 
suffered serious adverse effects, so most did not” (Steel 2018: 132-3; emphases 
added). If one adopts this interpretation, then the sentence “Paroxetine is 
generally well tolerated” is true. Second, as Steel’s characterization of misleading 
claims requires, the conclusion of the article “encourages others” to infer 
falsehoods (for instance, that it is safe to use Paxil), even if one chooses the 
interpretation under which the sentence comes out as true. As Steel stresses, 
misleading claims figuring in empirical studies exploit “epistemic 
vulnerabilities” of patients, physicians, and health insurers, because they lack the 
“key information, analytical skills, or time to adequately process the information 
presented” (Steel 2018: 139).16  																																																								
16 See Steel (2018: 135-140) for a detailed discussion of such “epistemic 
vulnerabilities” in terms of “inferential asymmetries”.  
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So, does Steel’s example provide a counterexample to the evidential 
account? I do not think so. I grant Steel that it is possible to describe the example 
he discusses as an instance of a misleading claim (in his sense of the term). 
Because of the vagueness of the expression “generally well tolerated” it is indeed 
possible to evaluate the sentence “Paroxetine is generally well tolerated” as true, 
if one presupposes that the relevant interpretation of “generally well tolerated” is 
that most patients do not experience severe adverse effects. Let us call this the 
“most patients”-interpretation of “generally well tolerated”. I agree with Steel 
that this is a possible interpretation of the vague sentence “Paroxetine is generally 
well tolerated”. However, I also think there is no good reason to accept the “most 
patients”-interpretation in the scientific context of Steel’s example.17 Instead, a 
more natural (or at least equally convincing) interpretation of the sentence 
“Paroxetine is generally well tolerated” can be expressed by the following truth 
conditions: only a very small percentage of people in the treatment group suffer 
from severe adverse effects (that is, a percentage considerably smaller than “11 
or about 12%” of patients in the treatment group) and there is only a small 
difference between the treatment group and the control (that is, some difference 
considerably smaller than a “450% increase in serious adverse effects”). If one 
adopts these truth conditions (or, this interpretation), then the resulting 
description of Steel’s example is in line with the evidential account: the biased 
researchers falsely assert that the experimental results of the study provide 
confirming evidence for the hypothesis that “Paroxetine is generally well 
tolerated”. Thus, Steel’s example does not provide a counterexample to the 
evidential account. 
Finally, I propose to classify the sort of examples that Steel discusses 
simply as an interesting case of a sponsorship bias regarding the choice of a 
scientific concept used to interpret the results of a study. To opt for the “most 
patients”-interpretation of “generally well tolerated” is a mistaken (or, at least, 
questionable) choice of a concept that aligns with the sponsor’s financial 
interests. This choice is in perfect analogy with Dr. Sommers’ choice of the 
“necessary and sufficient for its effect”-interpretation of causation (in the 
Tobacco case).     																																																								
17 One problematic feature of Steel’s view is that he fails to draw a clear 
distinction between (i) a vague claim having (or admitting) a possible 
interpretation under which it is true and (ii) accepting such an interpretation for 
certain (good) reasons. For instance, Steel seems to accept the “most patients”-
interpretation to raise his worry about standard definitions of bias and, indirectly, 
the evidential account in the context of the paroxetine example. I have to admit 
that it is unclear to me why he accepts this interpretation. 
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One might worry, as two reviewers did, that there are other examples that 
might support Steel’s view in a better way.18 For instance, one could imagine an 
experiment comparing the efficacy of drug A and drug B.19 Suppose further that 
the pharmaceutical company funding the research has a financial interest in 
producing and selling drug A. The study correctly reports that the empirical 
results strongly support the hypothesis that drug A is more effective than drug B, 
using a relative outcome measure to express the effect size.20 The effect size 
according to an absolute outcome measure is, however, not reported at all (for a 
presentation and discussion of such cases Stegenga 2015; Sprenger and Stegenga 
2017).  
Now, is this imagined scenario a counterexample to the evidential 
account? Don’t the industry-funded researchers report the truth about the results 
of their study? This scenario does not necessarily constitute a counterexample to 
the evidential account. To begin with, the scenario might involve a sponsorship 
bias regarding the choice of the kind of outcome measure used to interpret the 
data. If so, I think the evidential account is able to capture this kind of sponsorship 
bias correctly. Such a bias might be a part of the scenario if there is a stark 
difference between the effect sizes described by the two kinds of outcome 
measures: for instance, if the effect size according to the relative outcome 
measure is considerably large (say, 30%) and it is small relative to an absolute 
outcome measure (say, 3%) (for real cases with this structure see Stegenga 2015: 
67; Sprenger and Stegenga 2017: 843). According to the evidential account, the 
problematic feature of such a scenario consists in the fact that the industry-funded 
researchers omit a highly relevant piece of available information: here, they omit 
information about the effect size according to the absolute outcome measure, 
while they correctly report the effect size according to the relative outcome 
measure. Clearly, this omission serves to promote their sponsor’s financial 
interests. If the researchers take into account the effect size according to the 
absolute outcome measure, as they should according the principle of complete 																																																								
18	Steel (2018: 125-9) also discusses a rather complex case study, criticizing Bero 
(2014), that involves the strategy of “gaming the dose” in the course of a study. 
I believe this is another interesting instance of what Steel calls “misleading 
claims”. Addressing this case and others is a task for future research.      
19 One could enrich the scenario by imagining that such an experiment also 
involves a biased choice of the dose of drug B (“gaming the dose”), as one 
reviewer suggested. But I will keep things simple here. 
20 Roughly put, outcome measures are formal descriptions of the relationship 
between the values measured in the experimental group and in the control group 
of an experimental study (for a detailed formal exposition of different outcome 
measures, see Stegenga 2015: 65-6; Sprenger and Stegenga 2017: 841-3).	
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local evidence, then it is false to assert that the results of the study provide strong 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that drug A is more effective than drug B 
(as the industry-funded researchers in our scenario claim). This is just as the 
evidential account would have it. But why should the researchers consider the 
effect size according to the absolute outcome measure? If one follows the 
compelling arguments of Stegenga (2015: 67-8) and Sprenger and Stegenga 
(2017: sections 3-5), reporting the effect size according to an absolute outcome 
measure is the relevant concept in the context of medical interventions (including 
assessments of the efficacy of drugs) and, hence, this measure has to be 
considered when interpreting the results of a study. Thus, if Sprenger and 
Stegenga are right about the relevance of the absolute outcome measure, then the 
evidential account is able to capture the kind of scenario just described.  
To sum up this section, I have attempted to rebut two potential 
counterexamples to the evidential account. The first example is drawn directly 
from Steel’s recent work, the second was suggested by two reviewers. Opposing 
Steel, I have argued that, in both examples, the industry-funded scientists endorse 
false claims about evidential support relationships, which is in accordance with 
the evidential account.21  
To avoid misunderstandings, let me add two clarificatory remarks. First, 
this rebuttal does not force me to reject Steel’s plausible diagnosis that a claim 
such as “Paroxetine is generally well tolerated” encourages “others” (that is, non-
experts) to draw false conclusions and that this can be explained by “inferential 
asymmetries” which industry-funded researchers and their sponsors exploit. 
Similarly, the evidential account is compatible with empirical research in 
psychology showing that, as Sprenger and Stegenga (2017: 884-5) point out in 
the context of the second example, reporting (only) relative outcome measures 
leads to “proper reasoning fallacies” on the side of patients and physicians (that 
is, a non-expert audience). 
Second, if one adopts the evidential account, it is at least plausible to 
distinguish two distinct projects: (i) providing an account of what is epistemically 
wrong with the scientific research in the context of both examples discussed in 
this section, and (ii) providing an explanation of why non-expert audiences draw 
false conclusions from published scientific work. Providing an account of 
epistemic wrongness is the intended purpose of the evidential account. By 
contrast, providing such an explanation is ultimately a scientific rather than 																																																								
21 Although I believe that my rebuttal of these two potential counterexamples is 
successful, I acknowledge that it is a fruitful research question to explore and 
discuss additional kinds of misleading claims and their role in various types of 
sponsorship bias.   
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philosophical task (for instance, a task for psychologists and sociologists; 
Sprenger and Stegenga 2017: 844-5). However, one might even be optimistic that 
the evidential account could contribute a little piece to an explanation of why 
non-experts arrive at false conclusions: non-experts might draw false conclusions 
because they base their reasoning on false information about evidential support 
relationships after having read the publications of industry-funded scientists. 
 
3.5 Two Virtues  
Let me present two virtues of the evidential account:  	
First, although many types of sponsorship bias might involve researchers 
who intentionally assert falsehoods about evidential support relations (that is, 
researchers who lie to their audience), the evidential account does not necessarily 
depend on knowing the intentions of the biased scientists in question. I take this 
to be a virtue of the evidential account because it is notoriously difficult to 
determine what the intentions of scientists are or were (see also Biddle and 
Leuschner 2015). Surely, there are cases of sponsorship bias where historians and 
philosophers of science have access to documents revealing the intentions of 
biased researchers. Research sponsored by the tobacco industry exemplifies a 
class of paradigmatic cases where such documents are available (Glantz et al. 
1996; Proctor 2011). However, acquiring knowledge about the intentions of 
researchers is often simply beyond our reach.  
Second, I want to remain neutral with respect to the controversy regarding 
the value-free ideal – that is, the normative claim that scientists should minimize 
appeal to non-epistemic (that is, moral, political, and economic) values and only 
appeal to epistemic values. By claiming neutrality, I mean to say that my 
argument based on the evidential account should be acceptable for the proponents 
of the value-free ideal (such as Jeffrey 1956; Levi 1960; Lacey 1999) and its 
opponents (for instance, Rudner 1953; Longino 1990; Douglas 2000; Wilholt 
2009; Kitcher 2011; Biddle and Leuschner 2015). Let me provide a brief sketch 
of what this might amount to.  
When adopting the evidential account, proponents and opponents of the 
value-free ideal can (and, I believe, should) agree on two points with respect to 
the examples of sponsorship bias I present and discuss in Sections 2 and 3: (1) 
the industry-funded researchers in question endorse false claims about evidential 
support relations and there is good evidence (in these cases) that the non-
epistemic interests of the sponsor causally contribute to the fact that the scientists 
assert such falsehoods. (2) If the sponsors’ non-epistemic interests lead to 
falsehoods of this sort, then we are facing a situation in which non-epistemic 
interests do not play a legitimate role in science.     
However, proponents and opponents of the value-free ideal disagree 
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about what follows from their two points of agreement. Proponents of the value-
free ideal take points (1) and (2) above to vindicate their view that science should 
be free of non-epistemic values. By contrast, opponents of the value-free ideal 
would argue that points (1) and (2) do not entail that there is no legitimate place 
for non-epistemic values in science.     
It is not the purpose of the evidential account to settle this disagreement. 
Instead, the evidential account should be viewed as being logically independent 
of the controversy regarding the value-free ideal (as a general claim about the 
role of values in science). I take this neutrality to be another virtue of the 
evidential account, because it can be adopted by both friends and foes of the 
value-free ideal.  		
4. Relation to Other Views  
 
In this section, I will discuss how the evidential account relates to two prominent 
views of research affected by sponsorship bias articulated in the recent literature: 
first, Wilholt’s (2009) conventionalist view, and, second, Oreskes and Conway’s 
(2010) account that is based on the notion of disagreement with expert consensus. 
I will argue for two claims: (1) neither of the two views provides necessary and 
sufficient conditions for epistemic wrongness; (2) the evidential account should 
be regarded as a fruitful complement to and not necessarily as a competitor of 
these two views, at least under certain conditions. 
According to Wilholt’s (2009) conventionalist view, research affected by 
sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong – or, an “epistemic failure”, as Wilholt 
(2009: 92, 99) puts it22 – because such research violates conventionally accepted 
methodological standards within a specific research community. For instance, in 
the Bisphenol A case, the standard is violated that one should not use CD-SD rats 
if one investigates the effects of Bisphenol A (Wilholt 2009: 99).23  
Wilholt develops his account of the epistemic wrongness of sponsorship 
bias under the assumption that the value-free ideal of science has got to be 
rejected. In other words, he accepts the currently received view that even 
‘unbiased’, excellent science (at least sometimes) needs to draw on non-
epistemic values, as articulated by opponents of the value-free ideal in the recent 																																																								
22 Equivalently, Wilholt uses expressions such as “epistemic shortcoming” and 
“epistemic mistake” (Wilholt 2009: 92, 99).  
23 Biddle and Leuschner hold the conventionalist view as one subcondition of a 
sufficient condition for “epistemically detrimental dissent” (Biddle and 
Leuschner 2015: 273; see also Biddle et al. 2017: 167). 
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debate on science and values (see Section 3.5 for some representative references). 
As a consequence, Wilholt assumes that an answer to the question “what is 
epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias?” cannot simply 
be that biased research involves reference to non-epistemic values, because the 
same is true of instances of unquestionably good science. Wilholt argues that his 
conventional account is compatible with value-laden science and it also captures 
the “intuition that preference [or sponsorship] bias constitutes epistemic failure 
(rather than just being a matter of differing value judgments)” (Wilholt 2009: 99; 
emphasis added).24 Moreover, it is also helpful to make Wilholt’s ‘working 
assumption’ explicit because it uncovers a difference between Wilholt’s 
conventional account and the evidential account: the former is committed to 
rejecting the value-free ideal (at least in the version Wilholt presents), while the 
latter is intended to be neutral with respect to the value-free ideal (see Section 
3.5 above). 
Now, suppose one is willing to make the conventionalist assumptions that 
(a) methodological standards are indeed conventions25, and that (b) epistemic 
wrongness in cases of sponsorship bias consists in the fact that scientists do not 
conform to some relevant convention. However, even if one agrees with the 
conventionalists on these assumptions, one is (or, at least, I am) still left 
wondering what evidence justifies the methodological standard in question and 
why it is unjustified not to conform to some methodological standard.  
The evidential account is intended to provide an answer to precisely this 
sort of question – in terms of assessing researchers’ true or false assertions about 
evidential support relationships. For instance, a proponent of the evidential 
account might say that it is a justified convention to avoid using CD-SD rats in 
studies on Bisphenol A (supposing that there is such a convention), because, 
roughly put, studies involving this strain of rats do not provide any evidence for 																																																								
24 Although Wilholt accepts that scientific research is value-laden, he argues for 
an analysis of biases from an epistemological perspective. He aims at an account 
of “epistemic failure” instead of a “counter-intuitive moral analysis of biases” 
(Wilholt 2009: 95) that would reduce a critical discussion of biases to a purely 
moral (or political) dispute about diverging non-epistemic value judgments. I 
agree with Wilholt that the epistemological project is worth pursuing – of course, 
without dismissing the question of what is morally or politically wrong with 
sponsorship bias (see footnote 3). 
25 See Wilholt (2009: 98) for a more detailed reflection on the epistemological 
function of conventional methodological standards in science. In more recent 
work, Wilholt further elaborates a social epistemological framework that is based 
on the notion of epistemic trust in research communities (Wilholt 2013: sections 
3-4).  
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addressing the question whether Bisphenol A causes cancer. Hence, I picture the 
evidential account not necessarily as a competitor of the conventionalist view but 
rather as an independent foundation of the conventionalist view in that it provides 
an explication of the justification of methodological norms. 
Although the evidential account may (at least sometimes) function as a 
complement to Wilholt’s approach, I am not (unlike Wilholt) committed to the 
claim that the epistemic wrongness always consists in the violation of some 
methodological standard. I believe this is a virtue of the evidential account.  
Consider the following case as an illustration: violating a convention might not 
be necessary for epistemic wrongness, because the convention might be 
unjustified. Imagine the following counterfactual scenario to illustrate an 
unjustified convention. Suppose it were a convention in medical research on the 
effects of smoking cigarettes to define a cause as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for its effect, as Sommers does (Sections 2.3 and 3.3). In such a 
scenario, the conventionalist is not able to classify Sommers’ choice of notion of 
causation as biased, because he does not fail to conform to any convention in the 
relevant field of inquiry. However, proponents of the evidential account hold an 
advantage in this situation because they can raise the question whether this 
(counterfactual) convention is justified. For them, the most natural strategy is to 
argue that such a convention is unjustified because, for instance, defining 
causation in this manner does not cohere with how the notion is fruitfully used in 
other subfields of medical research and in other scientific disciplines (for reasons 
outlined in Section 3.3).26 
Let me now turn to a discussion of Oreskes and Conway’s view. At first 
glance, Oreskes and Conway (2010) appear to propose an alternative account of 
the epistemic wrongness of research that is subject to sponsorship bias. In 
particular, they appear to focus on analyzing the epistemic wrongness of creation 
of doubt cases. In the epilogue of their book, Oreskes and Conway argue for a 
“new view of science” – that is, their positive account of scientific knowledge 
and justification. This account is mainly based on the notion of expert consensus. 
For instance, take the following quotes expressing the core idea of the new view 
of science: science “provides only the consensus of experts, based on the 
organized accumulations and scrutiny of evidence” (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 
268), “there is simply the consensus of expert opinion on [a] particular matter. 
That is what scientific knowledge is” (ibid.), and “what counts as knowledge are 
																																																								
26 See de Melo-Martín and Intemann (2018: 50-3, 68-9) and Carrier (2018: 
section 3) for further objections to conventionalism. 
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the ideas that are accepted by the fellowship of experts” (Oreskes and Conway 
2010: 269).27  
Oreskes and Conway use the new view of science to argue that the claims 
of creators of doubt do not constitute scientific knowledge and are not justified. 
Hence, one might be tempted to interpret Oreskes and Conway as directly 
proposing the following account of what is epistemically wrong with creation of 
doubt cases: (a) the creators of doubt are non-experts in the field F of scientific 
research they attack (for instance, medical research or climate science), (b) the 
creators of doubt oppose the expert consensus in field F (for instance, the expert 
consensus that smoking causes lung cancer), and (c) we have good reason to 
believe that the creators of doubt have non-epistemic interests (such as financial 
interests or an anti-communist28 political agenda) increasing the likelihood of 
systematic errors (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 271-3). 
I partly agree with Oreskes and Conway: if someone is a non-expert in 
some field of inquiry, s/he opposes the expert consensus in this field, and s/he 
has potentially biasing non-epistemic interests, then her/his arguments should be 
reviewed with particular suspicion and care. However, I think that Oreskes and 
Conway should not be taken to provide an account of, what I call, epistemic 
wrongness. If one decided to read Oreskes and Conway as presenting an account 
of the epistemic wrongness, this reading would seem to exclude – on a priori 
grounds – the possibilities that (i) non-experts might be able to contribute 
valuable non-biased research that runs counter to the expert consensus a field of 
inquiry, and that (ii) even experts might be biased. To adopt a reading of Oreskes 
and Conway’s view that excludes such possibilities on a priori grounds strikes 
me as mistaken, because it is overly restrictive. Moreover, if understood as an 
account of epistemic wrongness, Oreskes and Conway’s approach appears to be 
limited to (certain) creation of doubt cases, because condition (a) above (the lack 
of expertise in the relevant field F) does not seem to be violated in the other two 
types of sponsorship bias discussed in this paper.29 
For these reasons, I believe a better and more charitable interpretation of 
Oreskes and Conway’s view is that disagreement with expert consensus 																																																								
27 Oreskes and Conway’s new view of science should be distinguished from 
another topic also discussed in the epilogue of their book: trust in experts. Their 
concept of informed or rational trust in experts is supposed to describe the 
epistemic attitude non-experts should adopt w.r.t. scientific experts (Oreskes and 
Conway 2010: 271-4). However, unlike the “new view of science”, their account 
of trust is not constitutive of criticizing creators of doubt as being epistemically 
wrong. 
28 See, for instance, Oreskes and Conway (2018: 27-8, 186, 248-9). 
29	See de Melo-Martín and Intemann (2018: 53-8) for additional objections.	
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(especially when in combination with lack of expertise and having certain non-
epistemic interests) is a valuable indicator of epistemic wrongness rather than an 
analysis or definition of epistemic wrongness itself. For present purposes, I take 
an indicator to be a piece of information increasing our confidence that there is 
something epistemically wrong with the results of some study.  
To be sure, there is no contradiction between this interpretation of 
Oreskes and Conway’s view and the evidential account. If one takes a closer look 
at Oreskes and Conway’s detailed arguments to the conclusion that industry-
funded tobacco research is epistemically flawed (Oreskes and Conway 2010: 32, 
241, 268), they typically identify cases of cherry picking (for instance, Oreskes 
and Conway 2010: 18, 187-8, 241) and instances of sponsorship biases regarding 
the choice of scientific concepts used to interpret experimental results, 
particularly concerning concepts such as causation, evidence, and uncertainty 
(for instance, Oreskes and Conway 2010: 30-34, 192-4).  
My constructive proposal is to distinguish more clearly between two 
issues that are not sufficiently disentangled in Oreskes and Conway’s work – that 
is, specifying indicators of epistemic wrongness and clarifying the concept of 
epistemic wrongness. If one interprets Oreskes and Conway as providing a 
helpful strategy for identifying indicators of epistemic wrongness, then the 
evidential account can make use of these indicators as reliable guides to detecting 
instances of sponsorship bias. However, it is important to stress that the evidential 
account has a different task than to identify indicators of epistemic wrongness. 
The goal of the evidential account is conceptual clarification – that is, to explicate 
what epistemic wrongness is. Thus, I take the evidential account to play the role 
of a fruitful complement to Oreskes and Conway’s approach.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have argued for an evidential account of what is epistemically wrong with 
research affected by sponsorship bias. According to the evidential account, 
research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if the 
researchers in question endorse false claims about evidential support 
relationships holding between some hypothesis and some body of empirical data. 
My focus was on examples of three paradigmatic types of sponsorship bias 
(regarding the choice of experimental design, of the selection and representation 
of data, and of the scientific concepts used to interpret the results of a study). I 
have defended the claim that the evidential account provides a satisfactory 
analysis of what is epistemically wrong with all three types of sponsorship bias.  
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I have presented several advantages of the evidential account: it is neutral 
with respect to two major theories of confirmation (Bayesianism and 
frequentism), its applicability does not depend on knowing the intentions of 
biased researchers, and it is neutral with respect to the value-free ideal. I have 
argued that the evidential account has a broader scope than competing accounts 
and that it may play, at least under certain conditions, a complementary role for 
Wilholt’s (2009) view and Oreskes and Conway’s (2010) account.  
One fruitful question for future research is to assess whether the 
evidential account can also be applied to further types of sponsorship bias (for 
instance, types resting on p-hacking and misleading claims) – and perhaps to 
other kinds of biases in science (such as publication bias in publicly funded and 
industry-funded research). In sum, I believe that the evidential account is 
promising and deserves further attention and discussion.    
 
 
6. Appendix: The Formal Bayesian Argument 
 
In Section 3.1, I provided an informal Bayesian argument for the evidential 
account in the context of the Bisphenol A case. Here, I will present a more formal 
Bayesian argument to the same conclusion.  
To begin with, we represent the relationship between the variables E, H 
and K in the following Bayesian network:  
 
 
That is, we assume that H and K are unconditionally independent, but become 
correlated if E is given. This is a highly plausible assumption. 
Next, we suppose again that P(K) = 𝑘 ≈ 1 and set P(H) = ℎ to some 
value between 0 and 1. To fully specify the prior probability distribution over the 
Bayesian network for the Bisphenol A case, we also assume that P(E|K,H) ≈P(E|K, ¬H) ≈ 1, which follows from the requirement that P(E|K) » 1 holds for 
all possible values of H, and set  
 P(E|¬K, H) = 𝛽 
E
H K
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P(E|¬K, ¬H) = 𝛿 
 
Let us now compute the posterior probability P(H|E), i.e. 
 P(H|E) = P(H, E)P(E) . 
 
We can determine P(H, E) and P(E) as follows:30 
 P(H, E) = P(H, E, K) + P(H, E,¬K) ≈ ℎ ∙ 𝑘 + ℎ ∙ 𝑘B ∙ 𝛽 = ℎ ∙ (𝑘 + 𝑘B ∙ 𝛽) 
 P(E) ≈ 𝑘 + 𝑘B 	 ∙ Cℎ ∙ 𝛽 + ℎB ∙ 𝛿D 
 
When substituting for P(H, E) and P(E), we obtain: 
 P(H|E) ≈ ℎ ∙ 𝑘 + 𝑘B ∙ 𝛽𝑘 + 𝑘B ∙ (ℎ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝑘B ∙ 𝛿) 
 
It is interesting to note that the fraction in the above equation converges to 1 as 𝑘 = P(K) ⟶ 1. Hence, P(H|E) ≈ P(H) in this limit. This result coincides with 
the conclusion of the informal Bayesian argument: E does not confirm H, or, at 
most, to a very small degree.    
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